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STATE OF NEW YURK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In The Matter of STUART WINKLER,
Petitioner,
-against-

COMMISSIONER ANDREA W. EVANS,
CHAIRWOMAN OF THE BOARD OF PAROLE,
Respondent,
For A Judgment Pursuant to ArticIe 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules.

Supreme Court Albany County Article 78 Term
Hon. George B. Ceresia, Jr., Supreme Cowt Justice Presiding
RJI # 0 1-12-ST3366 Index NO. 7915-1 1

Appearances:

StuayE Winkler

Inmate No. 0 1 -A-0384
Petitioner, Pro Se
Sullivan Correctional Facility
P.O. Box 116
325 Riverside Drive
Fallsburg, N Y 12733-0116
Eric T. Schneideman
Attorney General
State of New York
Attorney For Kespondent
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(Kevin P. Hickey,
Assistant Attorney General
of Counsel)

DECISIONIURDEWJUDGMENT
George B. Ceresia, Jr., Justice
The petitioner, an inmate at Sullivan Correctiona! Facility, commenced the instant
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CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination of respondent dated April 5,20 11
to deny petitioner discretionary release on parole. The petitioner is serving an indeterminate
term of imprisonment of 8 113 to 25 years for conspiracy in the second degree, and a term of
3 to 9 years for enterprise corruption. The conspiracy involved a plot to kill the judge

presiding over the criminal trial of charges of enterprise corruption. Among the many
arguments advanced by the petitioner, he contends that the determination of the Parole Board
to deny release was a clear case of being arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion

which demonstrates irrationality bordering on impropriety. He maintains that the Parole
Board did not consider whether there was a reasonabk possibility that if released, he would

live and remain at liberty without violating the law. In his view, the Parole Board failed to

follow its own rules and regulations and did not consider the relevant factors under Executive
Law 5 2594. He indicates that he graduated from college with an accounting degree in June

1974. He worked for twenty-five years in accounting and auditing, He asserts that he started
a business which employed 450 professionals. He claims he created 40,000 jobs, and paid

millions of dollars in income taxes. While raising a family he served as a Little League
basebalI manager and trave1 soccer coach.

With respect to the conspiracy charge, he indicates that his former celI mate and coconspirator, Karl Ligon has a lengthy criminal history involving violent felonies. He draws
a comparison between himself and Ligon, arguing that although in his view Ligon is a far

more dangerous individual than the petitioner, Ligon was allegedly released sixty days after

2

[* 3]

petitioner’s conviction.’ The petitioner also maintains that tkte Parole Board erred in not
applying amendments to Executive Law 0 2594 adopted by the State Legislaturein 20 1 1 (s

L 201 1, Ch 62). Lastly, he argues that the 24 month hold was excessive.

The reasons for the respondent’s determination to deny petitioner release on parole
are set forth as follows:

“Denied - Hold fur 24 months, March 20 13

“Parule is denied for the following reasons:
After a review of the record and this interview, it is the
determination of this panel that your release at this time is
incompatible with the welfare and safety of the community

“This decision is based on the following factors: The instant
offense of conpiracy Znd and enterprise corruption involved you
conspiring with another to murder the judge on the case of the
instant offense of enterprise corruption. In a scheme to defiaud,
you operating as the chief financial officer, acting in concert
sold stock to investors, using lies and misinterpretations while
making illegal profits from side deals, Also, incriminating
documents were destroyed. Note is made of your positive
programing, clean disciplinary record, and parole packet;
however, all relevant factors considered, discretionary release is
inappropriate at this time. For the panel to hoId otherwise
would so deprecate the seriousness of the crimes as to
undermine respect for the law.
Parole Release decisions are discretionary and, if made pursuant to statutory
requireme.nts, not reviewable (Matter of De La Cruz v Travis, 10 AD3d 789 [3d Dept.,
20041; Matter of ColIado v New York State Division of Parole, 287 AD2d 921 [3d Dept.,

‘To support this contention the petitioner makes reference to testimony which Ligon gave
at trial in which he allegedly admitted to a Iife-long history of crime involving drugs, weapons,

shootings, and robberies.
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200 I]). Furthermore, only a “showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety” on the part

of the Parole Board has been found to necessitate judicial intervention (see Matter of Silmon
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 476 [2000], quoting Matter of Russo v. New York State Bd. of

Parole, 50 NY2d 69,77 [ 19801; see also Matter of Graziano v Evans, 90 AD3d 1367,1369

[3d Dept., 20 Z 11). In the absence of the above, there is no basis upon which to disturb the
discretionary determination made by the Parole Board (E

Matter of Perez v. New York

State of Division of Parole, 294 AD2d 726 [3rd Dept., 2004).

The Court finds that the Parole Board considered the relevant criteria in making its
decision and its determination was supported by the record. A review of the transcript of the

parofe interview reveals that, in addition to the instant offenses, attention was paid to such
factors as petitioner’s disciplinary record and his plans upon release. He was afforded ample
time to make comments supportive of his release, most of which were devoted to describing
his success as a businessman, and the accomplishments of his children, The decision was

sufficiently detailed to inform the petitioner of the reasons for the deniaI of parole and it
satisfied the requirements of Executive Law 52594 & Matter of Siao-Pao, I 1 NY3d 773

[2008]; Matter of Whitehead v. Russi, 20 I AD2d 825 [3rd Dept., 19941; Matter of Green v.
New York State Division of Parole, 199 AD2d 677 [3rd Dept., 19931). It is proper and, in
fact, required, that the Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate‘scrimes and their
violent nature (seeMatter of Matos v New York State Board of Parole, 87 AD3d 1 193 [3d

Dept., 201 11; Matter of Dudley v Travis, 227 AD2d 863, [3rd Dept., 1996). The Parole
Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor that it considered in
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determining the inmate‘s application, or to expressly discuss each one (E

Matter of

MacKenzie v Evans, supra; Matter of Matos v New York State Board of Parole, supra;
Matter of Young v New York Division of Parole, 74 AD3d 168 I , 1681-1682 [3d Dept.,
20 101; Matter of Wise v New York State Division of Parole, 54 AD3d 463 [3d Dept., 20081)

Nor must the parole board recite the precise statutory language set forth in the first sentence

of Executive Law 6 2594 (2) ( c ) (A) (see Matter of Silver0 v Dennison, 28 AD3d 859 [3rd
Dept., 20061).

In other words, ‘‘[wlhere appropriate the Board may give considerable

weight to, or place particular emphasis on, the circumstances of the crimes for which a
petitioner is incarcerated, as well as a petitioner’s criminal history, together with the other
statutory factors, in determining whether the individual ‘will live and remain at liberty
without violating the law,’ whether his or her ‘release is not incompatible with the welfare
of society,’ and whether release will ‘deprecate the seriousness of [the] crime as to

undermine respect for [the] Iaw”’ (Matter of Durio v New York State Division of Parole, 3
AD3d 816 [3rd Dept., 20041, quoting Executive Law $259-i [2] [c] [A], other citations
omitted).

As relevant here, the 201 1 legislation & L 201 1 ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, 0 38-b,
et seq.) amended the Executive Law, as it relates to parole determinations in two ways. First,

Executive Law

0 259-c was revised to abolish the old guideline criteria, and establish a

review process that would place greater emphasis on assessing the degree to which inmates
have been rehabilitated, and the probability that they would be able to remain crime-free if

released. Said section now recites: “[tlhe state board of parole shall [J (4) establish written
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procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law. Such written procedures
shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the rehabilitationof persons appearing
before the board, the likelihood of success of such persons upon release, and assist members

of the state board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole
supervision” (L 20 1 1 ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, 0 38-b). This amendment was made effective

six months after its adoption on March 3 1,201I , that is, on October 1,20 1 1 (see 1;20 11, ch

62, Part C, Subpart A, 5 494fJ). In the second change, Executive 2594 (2) ( c )was amended
to incorporate into one section the eight factors which the Parole Board was to consider in

making release determinations (see L 2011 ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, § 28-f-1). This

amendment was effective immediately upon its adoption on March 3 I, 201 1 (see 1; 2011,
ch 62, Part C, Subpart A, 0 49) However, the latter amendment did not result in a substantive
change in the criteria which the Parole Board should consider in rendering its decision.
With regard to the issue of retroactivity of the 201 1 legislation, as noted, the parole

determination here was made on January 25,20 1 1, well before the legislation was enacted,

and well before the effective date of the amendment to Executive Law 259-c (4). Generally
speaking, statutory amendments ‘‘ are presumed to have prospective appIication unless the

Legislature’spreference for retroactivity is explicitly stated or clearly indicated” (Matter of

G h o n v Michael Vee Ltd., 96 NY2d 117, I22 [200 11, citing People v Oliver, 1 NY2d 152,
157). While remedial legislation often will be applied retroactively to carry out its beneficial
purpose, this is not the case where the Legislature“has made a specific pronouncement about

retroactive effect” @ Matter of Gleason v h&chael ’Vee Ltd., supra, at 122). In this
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instance, as the Court observed in Matter of Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole

(943 NYS2d 73 1, PIatkin, Richard M.,Sup. Ct., Albany Co., 2012), “the State Legislature
considered the question of the effectiveness of the 201 1 Amendments and determined that
the new procedures contemplated by the amendments to Executive Law Q 259-c (4) should

not be given effect with respect to administrative proceedings conducted prior to October I ,

20 1 1.” This Court agrees. Under such circumstances, there clearly was no Legislative intent
that the amendment to Executive Law 259-c be applied retroactively to parole determinations

rendered prior to October 1,2011 (see id.; see aIso Matter of Tafari v Evans, 20 12 NY Slip

Op 5 1355U [Sup. Ct., Franklin Co., 20 121)
In addition, the Parole Boards decision to hold petitioner for the maximum period (24
months) is within the Board‘s discretion and was supported by the record (see Matter of Tatta
v State of New York Division of Parole, 290 AD2d 907 [3rd Dept., 20021, lv denied 98
NY2d 604).

The Court has reviewed petitioner’s remaining arguments and contentions and finds

them to be without merit.
The Court finds the decision of the Parole Board was not irrational, in violation of

lawful procedure, affected by an error of law, irrational or arbitrary and capricious. The
petition must therefore be dismissed.
The Cowt observes that certain records of a confidential nature relating to the
petitioner were submitted to the Court as a part of the record. The Court, by separate order,

is sealing all records submitted for in cameru review.
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Accordingly, it is

ORDEmD and ADJUDGED, that the petition be and hereby is dismissed.

This shall constitute the decision, order and judgment of the Court. The original
decisiodorderljudgment is returned to the attorney for the respondents. All other papers are

being delivered by the Court to the County Clerk for filing. The signing of this

decisiodorderljudgment and delivery of this decisiodorderljudgment does not constitute

entry or filing under CPLR RuIe 2220. C o k e 1 is not relieved from the applicable
provisions of that rule respecting filing, entry and notice of entry.
ENTER
August &7,2012
Troy, New Yo&

Dated:
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George 8.Ceresia, JP.
Supreme Court Justice

Papers Considered:
1.

2.
3.

Order To Show Cause dated January 9,2012, Petition, Supposing Papers
and Exhibits
Respondent’s Answer dated April 30,2012, Supporting Papers and Exhibits
Petitioner’s RepIy dated May 30,2012
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